On the secular stagnation puzzle: high profits meet low investment by Marques, Maria Francina Magalhães
A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s degree in Economics 







On the Secular Stagnation puzzle:  























This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR 
Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR 
Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 
 
Abstract 
 The renewed Secular Stagnation hypothesis, put forward to explain the sluggish growth 
in the developed economies alongside a low interest rates and low inflation environment, has 
been largely considered in the literature. These are signs of under-investment relative to saving. 
However, recently, some economists have begun to note how puzzling these trends are, given 
that profitability has been high. Therefore, this paper approaches the puzzle that the current 
low investment in spite of high profits poses, evidencing that a possible reason may lay in the 
fact that concentration can contribute to hinder investment. Consequently, this has detrimental 
effects on economic growth and overall welfare, and possibly stagnation. We expose the 
reasoning behind the hypothesis as well as how it can be linked to the Secular Stagnation 
debate. Ultimately, our empirical analysis reveals that, in fact, we cannot reject that 
concentration may harm investment. 
 











1. Introduction  
 At present, “records high” profits are frequently proclaimed in stock markets and media 
as well as surprising innovations (The Economist, 2016). However, turning the page of the 
newspaper, articles written by economists reveal concerns regarding economic growth, lack of 
investment and unresponsive demand . Some even mention a possible “Secular Stagnation” 
(Summers, 2014). This appears puzzling. Though, not all companies are facing growing profits. 
And the number of enterprises with such profitability is also curtailing. The explanation this 
dissertation finds is in market concentration, which might be a shortcoming from an ever more 
intangible economy. If this hypothesis is indeed confirmed, it poses a market failure in the 
allocation of capital that precludes investment, namely in innovation, and consequently, is an 
obstacle to economic prosperity. 
Figure 1 - OECD aggregate GDP growth (annual %) 
 
 
As Figure 1 displays, since the Golden Age, the aggregate annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP in the OECD area has roughly dropped to half. Alongside, the growth in labour 
productivity, seen as the growth of real GDP per person employed, and the TFP have been 
slowing (ECB, 2017). Gordon (2012) holds the view that the main impact on productivity of 
Annual (%) growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added produced by all residents plus product taxes and excluding any subsidies not included in the value 




the last great invention – the Internet and the developments in the ICT1, which began around 
1960 - has been withered away in the past years, suggesting that the benefits of ongoing 
innovation on the standard of living will now on happen at a slower pace than during the past 
“industrial revolutions” or, similarly, will return to its (low) historical norm. And, as a matter 
of fact, the first two - between 1750 and 1830 and from 1870 to 1900 - made the economy 
prosper at least during the 100 years that followed each of them. Even so, does this mean that 
the new content currently being (and still to be) developed is condemned to lack the usefulness 
of earlier innovations? One cannot climb to that conclusion so fast. First, the tobin’s Q - the 
ratio between an asset's market value and its replacement cost- in the U.S. increased from 1 in 
1970 to 1.75 in 2015 (Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold, 2018), indicating that the market is 
overvalued. A q>1 means that the value of capital exceeds the cost of acquiring it. Thus, it 
should be profitable for firms to acquire additional capital. In fact, the share of corporate 
revenue going to capital rose as well. Second, as pointed, there have been reported “records 
high” profits (Summers, 2016; The Economist, 2016). Under standard assumptions, the rate of 
profit should reflect the marginal productivity of capital. Thus, the benefit of additional 
investment in new capital is currently high, especially considering that the risk-free interest 
rates have never been lower, and that Central Banks show the will of further holding that level 
to foster a sustainable growth in the economy. Surprisingly, the growth of the real net capital 
stock has decreased, even before the Great Recession (Magdoff and Foster, 2014; European 
Commission, 2013). On top of that, some years after the slump, investment remained below 
pre-crisis forecasts (IMF, 2015). This has been taken as puzzling. However, a growing body of 
research (Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold, 2018; Summers, 2016; Furman and Orszag, 2018; 
CEA, 2016) suggests that this trends can indeed be explained by an increase in market power 
and the consequent emergence of a non-zero-rent economy. 
 
1 Information and Communication Technology. 
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 A low interest rates and low inflation environment along with sluggish growth seems 
to be the “new normal” and not just the aftermath of the recession of 2009 (Summers, 2014). 
For instance, while capital goods prices are exceptionally low, some asset prices - such as the 
prices of real estate and other risky financial assets - are rapidly and oddly increasing without 
any strong reason. In part because the near zero returns on safer assets have been pushing 
investors to turn to riskier assets with higher yields (Teulings and Baldwin, 2014). The 
shortcoming is the creation of bubbles and financial instability.  
While this disproportionate demand for safe assets is a sign of excessive saving, the 
low price of goods suggests that money is not flowing into the real economy as before: 
investment and consumption are low. Hence, exists an imbalance between investment and 
saving, which translates in a fall of the natural interest rate of equilibrium perhaps to negative 
grounds2. Figure 2 illustrates the decline in the gross fixed capital formation growth for the 
high-income economies. 
Figure 2 -  Aggregate GFCF growth (annual %) of high-income economies3
 
 
2 This poses a problem to conventional monetary policy instruments due to the zero-lower bound on interest 
rate, especially in a unstable financial market. 
3 World Bank and OECD classification. 
Average annual growth rate of gross fixed capital formation based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 
It includes plant, machinery, and equipment purchases, land improvements and construction. 




Piketty (2015) evidenced that household financial wealth in the U.S., measured by the 
market value of housing and business assets, has increased from 250% of income in 1970 to 
400% in 2015. Nevertheless, this financial wealth is not embodied in new productive capital 
goods. Instead, it has been amassed through capital gains in the housing and stock markets. 
Hence, where does this wealth come from? And, if not to fixed capital formation, where is it 
being directed to? 
The value added that a company collects from the selling of goods and services has to 
be first divided between the costs of labour necessary to produce a certain level of output given 
the capital and technology available, the costs of material inputs and the costs of capital (the 
annual costs of using all capital inputs in production). The remaining, after taxes being 
accounted for, constitutes the pure profits of the corporation and can be distributed to the 
shareholders of the company through dividends or share buybacks, i.e. “downsize and 
distribute” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), can be retained and invested in fixed capital or 
can also be invested in financial assets - for example, through M&A deals and bond purchase. 
Similarly, depending on the bargaining power of workers, rents (the excessive returns to market 
activity that would have occurred anyway in the absence of that excess return) could also have 
accrued to them in the form of higher labour income (Weil, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015a). Conversely, 
in most developed economies, not only the increased rents are not being shared with the 
employees but the labour share (the labour costs as a percentage of value added) has even been 
decreasing (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin , 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Barkai, 2020). 
This can happen when there is a substitution from labour to capital inputs into production, for 
instance, assuming a considerable elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, if more 
capital is used in production, less workers will be needed to achieve the same level of output. 
On the other hand, the labour share decline can occur as the result of a decrease in its marginal 
productivity, which leads to a decrease in real wages. Theoretically, the price of a factor should 
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follow its marginal return unless there is a shift in the supply or demand of the given factor. 
Notwithstanding, the labour productivity has been increasing at a higher pace than the average 
hourly labour cost and that divergence is even more accentuated when the comparison is made 
to the median hourly wage (OECD, 2018). Thus, there has been a decoupling of wages and 
marginal productivity of labour and a rise in inequality. This may presumably be disclosing the 
influence of monopsony forces in the labour market, which themselves may be a product of 
market power concentration and decline of competition in the goods market. In fact, this would 
be an explanation not only for the decline in the labour share but also for the increase in the 
profit share, the slower fixed capital formation, as well as the diversion of resources from 
productive investment to rent-seeking financial activities which allow short-term gains (Haskel 
and Westlake, 2018; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016; Furman, 2015). Accordingly, evidence 
suggests a noticeable decrease in competition (Autor et al., 2017; Grullon, Larkin and 
Michaely, 2019). 
 The hypothesis is that, under low competition, there is a decline in business dynamism 
(OECD, 2017; Decker et al., 2016; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002) which ultimately results in 
lower innovation. Firstly, because the low pressure allows incumbents – generally larger 
companies (OECD, 2017) – to invest less in the pursuit of more efficient methods of production 
( as, for example, labour-saving technologies) (Storm and Naastepad, 2013) and in human 
capital development, as well as to engage less in the creation of new product prototypes, 
software and patents. As a matter of fact, having strong bargaining power in the labour market, 
they may already enjoy cheap unit labour costs, and can effortlessly recruit the more qualified 
individuals in the labour force without enticing high salaries as some start-ups offer. (Kim, 
2017; Barth et al., 2014; Bloom et. al, 2005). In addition, big corporations can easily obtain 
innovative ideas by “free-riding” on the R&D investment of the growing number of start-ups 
(or simply SMEs) entering the market (OECD, 2016, 2017), through M&A or by buying their 
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patents and outrights, for example (Haucap and Stiebale, 2019; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). 
In this way, large companies are not engaging in the major risks inherent to a first investment 
but still benefiting from the large capitalization of that assets at low cost. This, along with 
dividends and share buybacks, is one of the practices through which non-financial firms divert 
funds from the productive scope of the company to engage in financial activity that promises 
higher returns in the short-term, compatible with the desire of the institutional owners4 (Bushee, 
1998; Bushee, 2001, Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016). These conducts may help explain, in part, 
the high Q-ratios. 
Secondly, market concentration can result in lower innovation because it fosters a 
growing gap between the best performing and laggard firms5 (European Commission, 2020), 
which precludes the potential investment of the latter. Large firms typically have higher 
profitability, while small and young enterprises struggle to stay in the market, even if they are 
viable and more efficient, because they do not have access to as much funding as the former 
(Bernanke et al, 1998), which can benefit from an almost unlimited financing both by banks 
and in the capital markets (European Commission, 2020). Moreover, SMEs lack the 
capabilities accumulated by incumbents of exploiting “open innovation”6- i.e. benefiting from 
innovative ideas of other firms without the initial costs via spill overs -, of scaling intangible 
assets over their operations, and the chance of lobbying to contest the claims on their intangible 
property. Thus, leaders can effortlessly acquire or simply copy good ideas from start-ups or 
competitors, diminishing their incentives to enter the market or introduce innovations and, in 
addition, are better at profiting from them, creating synergies with other assets they already 
 
4 Bushee (1998, 2001) categorizes institutional investors into “dedicated” (DED), “quasi-indexer” (QIX), and 
“transient” (TRA). TRA, have high portfolio turnover and high diversification consistent with opportunistic 
strategies. DED and QIX both make long-horizon investments, but QIX institutions hold a diversified portfolio 
of assets thus they do not care about the return of each specific holding. 
5 Barth et al. 2014 and Song et al. 2015 suggest that much of the rise in earnings inequality is due to the 
widening dispersion of earnings between firms rather than within firms. 




own as well as network effects (Haskel and Westlake, 2018; Summers, 2016). Indeed, due to 
its intangible scope, the recent age of technology reinforces this mechanism all the more 
(Stiglitz, 2015). Consider that some of the most successful corporations of the present required 
much less capital than the former to achieve their economic size.  
In sum, the increase in market power and decline in competition, besides contributing 
to widen income inequality7 and divergence across firms, constitute a market failure in the 
allocation of capital, which weakens investment, especially innovation. Ultimately, this 
undermines economic growth and prosperity through lack of Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction” and the multiplier effect. Therefore, it may presumably constitute an explanation 
for the puzzles that have put Secular Stagnation under intense debate.  In fact, this hypothesis 
has been given more attention and recognition in the literature recently.  
The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the conundrum of underinvestment 
along with high profitability in the business economy is more a hint than a puzzle. To achieve 
that, I will first display previous contributions in the literature (section 2) - regarding Secular 
Stagnation, the link between concentration and investment, and concerning the determination 
of investment behaviour. In section 3, the empirical approach and results will be presented. 






7 Ultimately, an uneven distribution of income can lead to lower consumption, under the assumption that 
individuals with lower income will have a higher propensity to consume out of their income. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Secular Stagnation 
The Secular Stagnation hypothesis gained momentum with the Larry Summers’ speech 
at the IMF’s 2013 Annual Research Conference (Summers, 2014), when pre-crisis GDP levels 
had been surpassed, but few economies had yet returned to pre-Crisis growth rates even with 
the easiness of near-zero interest rates. An imbalance between savings and retracted investment 
was pushing the natural real interest rate of equilibrium below zero, precluding full 
employment.  
However, the concept had been firstly put forward by Hansen (1939) in the last years 
of the Great Depression, as a state with “sick recoveries which die in their infancy and 
depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of 
unemployment”. Hansen theorised that before, the growth in the U.S. had only been sustained 
by innovations and the expansion of land, of resources and population and thus, since at that 
point in time they were consumed, large investment expenditures would have to occur to 
sustain growth. However, his idea was disregarded since it was blurred by the growth promoted 
by the WWII’s expenses and the following baby-boom. Nevertheless, Samuelson (1989) 
developed a Keynes-Hansen-Samuelson multiplier-accelerator model of secular stagnation, 
and in 1952, Steindl presented a post-keynesian approach built on Kalecki’s work on economic 
dynamics (Magdoff and Foster, 2014). 
Summers (2014), along with others, suggests that the reasons for the trends may be an 
increase in life expectancy with no corresponding increase in the retirement age, a population 
growth’ decline, greater risk aversion and increased regulation in the wake of the financial 
crisis, hysteresis, an acceleration of inequality as well as the changing character of the 
productive economic activity to industries with low capital intensity. While Summers (2015) 
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presents a more demand-side perspective, Gordon (2015) has a supply-side view. Even before 
Summer’s speech, Gordon (2012) presented “six headwinds” which could explain flattering 
innovation: demographics, education, energy and environment, private and government debt, 
inequality and globalization in an ICT era. Later, in the Secular Stagnation debate mentions 
only four (Gordon, 2014). Only the last two worries of both Summers and Gordon are adjacent 
to the subject of this paper. On the contrary, Glaeser (2014) rejects the notion that human 
inventiveness has stalled (as does Mokyr (2014)), instead he questions whether today’s 
inventions offer widespread benefits. Taylor (2014) denies that secular stagnation is coherent 
with the current facts. 
Reviewing the literature around Secular Stagnation cannot be accomplished without 
mentioning the book compiled by VoxEU, which gathers the views of Teulings and Baldwin  
(2014), Krugman (2014), Gordon (2014), Summers (2014), Eichengreen (2014), Caballero 
(2014), Glaeser (2014) and others. Krugman (2014) states that the “buzz” around Secular 
stagnation should not be overlooked, stressing a “secular decline in real interest rates”, that 
deleveraging and demographic trends would weaken future demand and particularly that the 
zero lower bound (ZLB) mattered more than was previously thought. Nick Crafts notes in his 
chapter that “The depressing effects of slower growth of productive potential will probably be 
felt more keenly in Europe”. Summers (2014) emphasises that “it may be impossible for an 
economy to achieve full employment, satisfactory growth, and financial stability 
simultaneously simply through the operation of conventional monetary policy” and evidences 
the inadequacy of conventional formulations to deal with the issue.  
Indeed, both the New Classical and New Keynesian traditions had focused on the 
volatility around the normal level of output and employment, presuming that, with or without 
policy intervention, the market will eventually eliminate output gaps and restore full 
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employment. During the “Great Moderation” the DSGE8 models were sufficient, Summers 
(2014) argues. Additionally, the ZLB9 poses difficulties is modelling. Eggertsson and Mehrotra 
(2014) make the first attempt to model the new Secular Stagnation hypothesis, through an 
OLG10 New Keynesian model. The essential features of the model, which allow for a low 
growth and low interest rate equilibrium, are the downward wage rigidity, the constraint to the 
young generation’s borrowing level and the ZLB included in the Taylor rule. The result is a 
demand curve that is upward sloping for low inflations and a supply that is vertical at full 
employment and positively sloped for low inflations, in the AS-AD schedule. The 
simplification of the model contrasts with the hypothesis of this paper since the producers are 
price-takers and have a zero-profit.  
Krugman (2014) suggested loose monetary policy through unconventional policy 
instruments, in order to stimulate expectations of higher inflation and low interest rates and 
Summers (2014) underscores the importance of fiscal policy in these circumstances. 
Conversely, Starbatty and Stark (2017) explicit the view of the Austrian school that central 
bank policy is no longer part of the solution but is becoming part of the problem, and that ultra-
loose money policy enables banks to keep zombie companies alive leading to a substantial 
economic burden and a fall in productivity. In this paper I abstain from thoughts regarding 
monetary policy. 
 More importantly, Summers’s (2016) article “Corporate profits are near record highs. 
Here’s why that’s a problem.” reveals the possibility of a link between Secular Stagnation and 
lower competition. Similarly, I intend to clarify the aforementioned relation, explaining the 
under-investment. 
 
8 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. 
9 Zero Lower Bound. The “impossibility” of central banks to set the nominal interest below zero. 
10 Overlapping generations model. The authors considered three generations. 
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2.2. Linking Concentration and Investment 
Consonant with this paper, the downward pattern in business dynamism has been 
highlighted by Decker et al. (2014), for example. Similarly, both Decker et. al. (2016) and 
Grullon, Larkin and Michaely (2019) document decreased competition. The latter refers that a 
“structural shift” has weakened competition. Bronnenberg et al. (2012) evidence concentration 
at the product market level. And Nekarda and Ramey (2010) analyse potential rises in price-
cost mark-ups over time.  
Autor et al. (2017) report that the rise of more productive, superstar firms may have 
contributed to a decrease in competition, adding that these firms display a lower labour share 
of value added. Decker et al. (2015) argue that the decline in business dynamism was observed 
across all sectors since 2000, including the usually high-growth information technology sector, 
and not just in selected sectors (notably retail), as occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Alternatively, an increase in the pure profit share - the fraction of pure profits gross 
value added – is considered indicative of an increase in market power and decline in 
competition. As a matter of fact, Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013) document a decline in labour 
share for the U.S., and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) evidence a broad, worldwide retreat 
of labour income. Barkai (2020) has presented intriguing evidence that the pure capital share 
(usually presumed as responsible for shrinking the share of income going to labour) has 
decreased, whereas the pure profit share increased. Rognlie (2015) highlights that overall, the 
net capital share has increased from 1948, but when this rise is disaggregated, the sector 
contributing to it was essentially the housing sector, and all others have a slightly negative or 
zero contribution, as the fall and rise may have offset each other. Additionally, Furman and 
Orszag (2018), albeit more interested in the repercussions on income inequality, argue that 
there has been a trend of increased dispersion of returns to capital across firms. Indeed, the 
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distribution among publicly traded corporations appears to have grown more skewed to the 
high end with time. Similarly, Barth et al. (2014) and Song et al. (2015) suggest that much of 
the rise in income inequality results from the increased dispersion of earnings between firms 
rather than within firms. Stiglitz (2015) and Piketty (2014) also stress the high and uneven 
business returns and make their point regarding competition. 
Linking the lethargic investment and innovation to the lower of competition and/or 
business dynamism, two papers were particularly taken into consideration. Primarily Gutiérrez 
and Philippon (2016), which analyse private fixed investment in the U.S. for 30 years, revealing 
that investment does not significantly depend on measures of profitability and valuation, 
particularly Tobin’s Q. Therefore, they demonstrate preference for theories that predict low 
investment despite high Q. Using both industry-level and firm-level data, it is tested whether 
11under-investment relative to Q is driven by decreased competition (due to technology, 
regulation or common ownership), financial frictions, measurement error (due to intangibles 
or globalization), or stiffened governance and short-termism. They do not find support for 
theories based on risk premia, financial constraints, or safe asset scarcity, and only weak 
support for regulatory constraints. Particularly, they emphasize that under-investment may in 
fact be linked to financialization. Similarly, I consider financialization - the "influence" of 
financial markets and institutions over the economy and the preference of overall businesses 
for investments in rent-seeking activities (namely in the FIRE sector), diverting capital from 
the main activity of the company – as one of the inherent developments from higher 
concentration. As a matter of fact, an increasing portion of savings and wealth is used to inflate 
the prices of already existing assets - real estate and stocks - instead of being invested to create 
new production and innovation. Secondly, Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold (2018) develop a 
model of a DSGE economy with three modifications which allow them to explain five trends 
 
11 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector. 
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in the U.S. – (1) an increase in the financial wealth-to-income ratio despite low savings rates, 
(2) an increase in Tobin’s Q, (3) a decrease in the real rate of interest, while the measured 
average return on capital is relatively constant, (4) an increase in the pure profit share and (5) 
a fall in investment-to-output, even given (2) and (3). Correspondingly to the present study, 
they hypothesize that an increase in monopoly is driving these broad macro-trends. However, 
in their model, concentration is translated through changes in mark-ups. CEA (2016) describes 
how competition between firms is beneficial for all the economy in general, but also how these 
benefits can be lost when competition is weakened by firms’ actions or government policies. 
Further literature suggests that this link is stronger for sectors more technological 
advanced. Aghion et. al, (2009) provide evidence that the threat of technologically advanced 
entry spurs innovation incentives - as predicted by Schumpeterian growth theory - in sectors 
close to the technology frontier, but not in laggard sectors, where the threat reduces 
incumbents’ expected rents from innovating. Haskel and Westlake (2018) make the point that, 
albeit the business economy is turning from tangible to intangible assets, which are not well 
measured, that does not constitute the main motive for the stagnation trends. The issue arises 
from the properties of intangibles: scalability and the possibility of spill-overs.12 “Leader” 
companies are “experts” in benefiting from other firms ideas and can take advantage of the 
scalability feature of intangibles and of the synergies they allow (when combined with other 
complementary assets they have accumulated), while lagging firms find difficulties in 
exploiting spill-overs and in capturing the benefits of their investments. They explain that, not 
only investment decreases due to lower innovation from the lagging firms, but also the leaders 
have lower incentives to innovate by themselves, especially given the alternative rent-seeking 
activities at their disposal. Also, leaders may be focussed on managing the complexities of their 
 
12 Indeed, following Haskel’s idea, intangibles nearly assume the properties of public goods of being “non-
rivalrous” and “non-excludable.” 
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companies. Their assessment was essential to the shape the hypothesis of the present paper, as 
well as Furman’ (2015) remarks. He stresses the importance of investment for growth and 
evidences three puzzles: the impact of technology on investment, rising returns to capital, and 
potential mismeasurement. Additionally, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) underscore the 
dichotomy of the “bounty of technology”13 and the growing differences in material success 
among households (the “spread”). Interestingly, they point to the lower social mobility and to 
globalization as obstacles to higher incomes and growth. Globalization may be another reason 
for stagnation in developed economies due to the replacement of domestic investment and 
workers by offshoring (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013). However, Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
(2014) have the view that automation may have had more impact. In the empirical section of 
this work, through the addition of foreign direct investment outflows in the main equation, I 
evaluate the influence of globalization on investment.  
2.3. Investment Determination  
Contemporary theories of aggregate investment behaviour in the literature and 
subsequent empirical studies developed from the accelerator model, the neo-classical model 
first proposed by Jorgensen (1963), the Tobin’s Q model (Tobin, 1969; Tobin and Brainard, 
1968) and the option theory. The accelerator model describes investment as a function of the 
desired stock of capital, which is determined by output growth (the “acceleration”). But 
because the model overlooks the influence of uncertainty, profits, market imperfections, 
financial aspects and other variables, it has been reformulated over time into the flexible 
accelerator model of investment (Goodwin, 1948). The neo-classical specification is another 
an alternative to the rigid accelerator models, augmented to include the effects of relative 
 
13 The increase in volume, variety and quality of products alongside a decrease in the cost of products and services. 
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prices, namely the user cost of capital14 alongside the lagged level of output. Conversely, under 
Tobin’s model, the level of investment is determined by the average q-ratio (the market value 
of the firm relative to the replacement cost of its capital). I will not follow the q-ratio model 
since it has been proved empirically irrelevant (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016).   
Moreover, in this investigation, I decided to discard the contributions presenting the 
real economy (and thus investment) as dependent upon the monetary policy environment 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Mishkin, 1996), given the short period of analysis of this 
empirical work (from 1998 to 2017) and given the lack of effectiveness of the credit channel 
that has been felt, mainly due to the liquidity trap (Keynes, 1936; Krugman et. al, 1998), but 
also due to the response to the uncertainty of the commercial banks themselves - not actually 
translating the more loosened monetary policy into higher credit to their borrowers 










14 The cost of capital is computed from the purchase cost of the additional capital, the rates of interest and 
depreciation and the levels of relevant taxes. 
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3. Empirical Specification 
 In order to examine whether a higher concentration may be propitious to lower 
innovation in the business sector, I will resort to a country level analysis on the market 
economy’ concentration and investment in the non-financial business (aggregated). The 
following specification (1) is proposed: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   , 
where 𝑖 = 1,2, … 22 identifies each country and 𝑡 = 1,2, … 19  corresponds to the year of each 
observation. 𝛼 is a constant term (individual and time-invariant) and 𝛽𝑐, with 𝑐 = 1,2,3,4, stands 
for the coefficients relative to each of the independent variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term for each 
observation. The explanatory variables, following their order in equation (1), are: the change 
in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (multiplied by 100), the logarithm of fixed capital’ stock, 
OECD’s Business Confidence Index (BCI) and lastly, the net foreign direct investment 
outflows as a percentage of GDP, for each country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The dependent variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡, 
is the gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of the gross operating surplus of the non-
financial market economy for each country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The computation consists in the 
following (2)15: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡  (%) =
𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1−𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
*100 
The main specification (1) is in line with the flexible accelerator models, in which 
output determines the desired capital. The flexibility arises from including the influence of a 
market imperfection such as concentration (through HHI) and the possibility of offshoring, 
reflected in FDI. Furthermore, future output depends on its previous values but lately also on 
uncertainty and rational expectations. Therefore, the model considers a business confidence 
 
15The denominator ( 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡) is an approximation for the aggregated Gross 
Operating Surplus of the market economy. 
18 
 
indicator (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡) as regressor, as well as the gross operating surplus proxy (in 𝑡 − 1) as 
denominator of the dependent variable. In fact, the growth of 𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑡−1 nearly mimics output 
growth - given that labour compensation has been almost stagnant during the 20 years of our 
analysis (and abstracting from government transfers). 
The choice of the ratio between GFCF and the gross operating surplus as outcome 
variable is due to its potential for comparison between different economies but also because it 
enables to place the value of investment in perspective with the capability (of each economy) 
to generate it. Moreover, it is supposed that both the numerator and denominator move 
similarly through business cycles, which might neutralize the influence of slumps or better-
than-average years. 
3.1. Data 
 The required data was retrieved from several sources, presented in table 1. It comprises 
22 OECD countries from 1998 to 2017. The sample consists of all the economies covered by 
the EU KLEMS database, excluding six of them, which revealed missing data for one or more 
variables in the time period considered. A list with the economies is in the appendix. 
Table 1 - Sources of the required variables 
 
Variables  Sources Aggregation Units 
𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  
𝐾𝑖𝑡  
EU KLEMS Database (2019) 
Market Economy 
minus Financial 






Volume 2010 ref. prices 
∆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡  WITS – Country Profile (2020) 
Market indicator of 
each country 
p.p. 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡  OECD (2020) Country NA 






 In the EU KLEMS database, “Market economy” corresponds to all industries excluding 
real estate, public administration, defence, education, human health, social work activities as 
well as those having households as employers16. That definition is adopted in this paper. Data 
restricted to the non-financial market economy was not available. Thus, to retrieve the values 
for the market economy excluding financial activities, the values for the market economy were 
subtracted by the values relative to the financial and insurance industry17. The variables 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡  
and 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 concern all fixed assets and the variable 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the sum of net investment in equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital from the reporting economy to the rest of 
the world, as a proportion of GDP.  The criterion for considering the existence of a direct 
investment relationship is the ownership of at least 10 percent of the ordinary shares of voting 
stock. The BCI provides information on future developments, based upon opinion surveys in 
the industry sector. Numbers above 100 (=long term average) suggest confidence in near future 
business performance, and numbers below 100 indicate pessimism towards future 
performance. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in the appendix. It is expected 
that  𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 has a positive impact on 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡 since, for example, economies with an higher stock 
of capital are likely to suffer from higher capital depreciation, which is part of GFCF. Likewise, 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 should have a positive influence because it represents higher confidence in the business 
sector. On the other hand, in the case of a constant share of FDI inflows (% GDP), the larger 
the foreign direct investment outflows as a percentage of GDP, the lesser would probably be 
the funds directed to investment in domestic assets. Though, a simultaneous (and proportional) 
increase in FDI inflows could offset the impact of the rise in outflows. Lastly, if ∆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡> 0 - 
and the higher that value is - the concentration is supposed to be increasing and thus, following 
 
16 The industries excluded were L, O, P, Q, T and U - in accordance with the industry classification (NACE Rev. 2/ISIC Rev. 
4) and the European System of National Accounts (ESA 2010).  
17 Industry classification of the Financial and insurance activities is K. 
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the hypothesis this paper aims to test, the investment share of gross operating surplus is 
expected to decrease.  
3.2. Results  
 After conducting the Wooldridge test and the Pesaran's test, the evidence was pointing 
to the presence of autocorrelation as well as cross sectional independence. In these 
circumstances, despite the coefficient estimates from common panel estimators— such as fixed 
effects (FE), random-effects (RE), or pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimators—are still 
consistent (even though inefficient), the standard error estimates are biased. Therefore, because 
statistical inference based on such standard errors would be invalid, the estimation of equation 
(1) was led with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. These heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent and robust standard errors are produced in a nonparametric covariance matrix 
proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
 However, this procedure has the shortcoming of leading to inviable Hausman test 
results (Hoechle, 2007). Therefore, both Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimations were 
conducted. Conversely, the OLS estimation was proved inappropriate against the former two, 
through the F-test of whether all country-effects equal zero and through the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test, respectively. In addition, unit-root tests revealed stationarity of all 
variables included in this model. The variable HHI in levels, non-stationary, was replaced with 
its first difference. The outcomes of these examinations are presented in the appendix. The 
results of the estimations through Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimators are exhibited 
in table 2. 
In line with the hypothesis put forward in this paper and others (Gutiérrez and 
Philippon, 2016; Eggertsson et. al, 2018), both estimations demonstrate a negative coefficient 
( of -1,57 p.p. with RE and -1,15 p.p. with FE) for the change in the concentration index, 
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suggesting that higher concentration may contribute to lower the share of gross operating 
surplus directed to GFCF, under a significance level of 10%, along with other factors. Indeed, 
higher capital stock may also lead to lower the investment share of 𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑡−1, since the coefficient 
of the logarithm of the stock of capital is also negative and significant even at a significance 
level of 5% (similarly to Jorgenson (1963)). On the other hand, the results reveal a positive 
impact on 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑔𝑖𝑡  from both business confidence (𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡) - as expected - and 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡. However, 
while BCI is significant at the 1% level of significance, it cannot be rejected that the impact of 
𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 might be null. The reason for the insignificance of net FDI outflows (% GDP) on 
influencing investment is likely to be the fact that its increases arise along with increases of 
investment inflows, which would contribute to increase the dependent variable (as You and 
Solomon (2015) found for China). Thus, the resulting increase in GFCF by non-residents would 
offset the investment channelled to offshoring instead of domestic activities. 
Table 2 - Panel estimation results 
 
 Given the above, the estimation was repeated excluding the variable 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡. The 
results are given in table 3 and the estimation output is in the appendix. As a matter of fact, 
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they demonstrate a better fit than the first two estimations. In addition, under this specification, 
the variable ∆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 shows more significance comparing both fixed-effects estimations– 
revealing a rise in the p-value from 0.056 to 0.062-, but less significant comparing the two 
random effects estimations - the p-value decreases from 0,097 to 0.069. However, it is still 
relevant at the 10% significance level.  
 Finally, two additional estimations (omitting 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡) were conducted to consider the 
effects of time that are invariant between cross-section units. These could be relevant given the 
fact that our period of analysis includes the 2009 recession. The first used time dummies (time-
effects). In this case, although the coefficients for the variation in HHI were still negative in 
both RE and FE regressions, the results were less favourable towards the confirmation of the 
hypothesis of negative influence from concentration on the investment variable. The p-value 
associated with the coefficient in each estimation was of 0.252 and 0.407, respectively. Thus, 
based on this result, we would not be able to reject that the ∆𝐻𝐻𝐼 might have a null impact. The 
estimation output is displayed in the appendix. The second specification included a time-trend, 
which was significant only in the random effects’ regression, at the 1% level. However, in both 
RE and FE regressions, the results reveal a negative coefficient for the change in the 
concentration index, in accordance with the main specification results. In addition, all variables 
besides the time trend demonstrate relevance at the 1% significance level. 
 Nevertheless, these results should be examined prudently because they were estimated 
based on a small sample of economies and, moreover, some variables that could be relevant 
were not included due to unavailability of data. Even though, other regressors - venture capital 
growth rate (%), the cumulative share of the population with tertiary education (%), the share 
of income accruing to the top 10% highest paid (%) as well as the domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) - were tested and revealed to be non-significant at a 10% level, 




 Since Larry Summers’ 2013 speech, in which the potential issue of Secular Stagnation 
was re-introduced, there has been wide interest in investigating this hypothesis further. The 
existing literature has extensively exposed the limitations that the zero lower bound poses to 
monetary policy, hindering its effectiveness in boosting demand in the economy. This applies 
to both FED, ECB and BoJ policies. Moreover, the demographic trends as well as the 
difficulties in coping with private and government debt have also been put forward as possible 
causes. A more unsettling theory was the one suggesting a return to a low historical growth, 
“normal” in a state with no largely impactful invention as the steam engine or electricity 
(Gordon, 2014). The latter assumes that the innovation aptitude might be currently weak. 
Alternatively, it has also been argued whether the shift to a more intangible capital era is 
contributing to sluggish income and investment growth,  due to its poor measurement but also 
its inherent properties (Haskel and Westlake, 2018).  
Nevertheless, it is essential to dig more profoundly to understand how Secular 
Stagnation can be transversal to economies that, despite sharing the classification of 
“developed”, display many distinct features. Hence, this paper exposes a hypothesis that lately 
has been put forward under a few perspectives - for example, Summers (2016) – but has not 
yet been given much attention. Namely, the possibility that concentration, alongside the 
consequent financialization, reduced business dynamism and lower social mobility, may be 
one of the main contributors to the decline in innovation and, subsequently, investment. As a 
result, under-investment precludes prosperity, growth and has a negative influence on interest 
rates, given that saving is in excess. Ultimately, the aim of this study is to expose the theory 
that concentration may harm investment, as well as to clarify the connection between that 
hypothesis and Secular Stagnation, suggesting that it may be the missing piece of the so 
remarked “puzzle” (Furman, 2015; Lazonick, 2014). Alongside, an empirical analysis enabled 
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to test whether concentration has been having a negative impact on investment. And, as a matter 
of fact, the findings of the empirical investigation followed here support that hypothesis, with 
at least 10% significance. The fact that significance was found estimating with both FE and RE 
may be indicative of a considerable part of the impact of concentration on investment coming 
from changes of concentration within each cross-section unit (with time). However, these 
results should be taken cautiously because, due to lack of data available, the sample is limited, 
as well as the variables that could be included. Information regarding Tobin-q, the proportion 
of financial assets on total assets, the share of institutional ownership, as well as the interest 
rate spread between large enterprises and SME’s, the share of total revenue accruing to the top 
𝑥 companies of the distribution and other measures of concentration would be pertinent in this 
analysis, but were not available for a considerable sample and therefore a simpler model was 
chosen. Nonetheless, other variables such as venture capital growth rate (%), the cumulative 
share of the population with tertiary education (%), the share of income accruing to the top 
10% highest paid (%) and the domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) were 
tested and revealed to be non-significant at a 10% level, when added to the specification (1), 
which uses Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.  
Given the above, the findings of this study could support the point that the issue is not 
that there is stagnation in the creation of wealth – as stressed by Eggertsson et. al (2018) - but 
instead, that wealth itself may possibly not have been effectively allocated to production and 
development, but towards less prosperous ends, not benefiting the overall welfare. The 
structure of developed economies (as well as the endogenous evolution of technology) is 
possibly behind that failure. 
However, institutions are a key force shaping how an economy functions and cannot be 
ignored (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2015). While most regulation is directed to foster 
competition and business dynamism, another can have the opposite effect. Indeed, a larger 
25 
 
share of the rise in profits and valuation has been due to factors associated with increasing 
regulation and political activity (Bessen, 2016) - this may be through bailouts, creation of entry 
barriers, government contracts, etcetera. Presumably, this increase happens in part because 
technologies are getting more complicated and, accordingly, the grant of patents and property 
rights has become of extreme necessity - otherwise there is no benefit to innovate. 
Nevertheless, a quest for an adequate balance of regulation is mandatory as well as a more 
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Figure 3– Descriptive Statistics of variables 
 
Note: 
1. gos_p is the Gross Operating Surplus proxy (in the previous year) computed with euation (2). 
2.  Inf is the Investment (GFCF) in non-financial activities for the market economy. 
3.  dhhi corresponds to ∆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡  
4. All the other variables are as presented in the text. 
















Figure 6 – Estimation with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors –Random Effects (FDI omitted) 
 








Figure 8 -  Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
39 
 
Figure 9 – Pesaran’s test for cross-sectional independence 
 
Figure 10 – Unit-root test for HHI in levels (with no lags, drift or trend) 
 

































Figure 18 - Estimation with time trend (RE) 
 
 
Figure 19- Estimation with time trend (FE) 
 
